Because CEO turnover events provide a the board of directors with a unique opportunity to potentially completely restructure CEO compensation packages, changes to CEO compensation following a turnover event could prove to inform the ongoing debate regarding CEO compensation. This paper investigates what happens to CEO compensation when a turnover event occurs. Specifically, I examine CEO compensation levels and pay-performance sensitivity for incoming and outgoing CEOs involved in turnover events at public companies in the United States. My main findings are as follows: 1) incoming CEOs are paid as much as or more than those they replace, 2) outsider replacements are paid more than their predecessors even after controlling for education and skills, and 3) CEOs who are forced out are not paid differently from those who replace them, while CEOs who leave voluntarily are paid significantly less than their replacements. Further analysis reveals that proxies for managerial power including CEO tenure, CEO centrality, founder status, and high CEO ownership cannot explain these results. Overall, these findings are difficult to reconcile with the view that managerial power is the primary determinant of CEO compensation.
Introduction
CEO turnover events provide a unique opportunity for boards of directors to restructure CEO compensation packages. As such, adjustments to CEO compensation packages occurring around such events can provide information regarding the ongoing debate concerning CEO compensation. This paper investigates the determinants of CEO compensation by exploring what happens to CEO compensation when turnover events take place. Specifically, I examine CEO compensation levels, pay-performance sensitivity, and "excess pay" (measured as the residual from a standard model of compensation) for a sample of 1,232 incoming and outgoing CEOs involved in turnover events in U.S. public companies between 1993 and 2006.
Executive compensation has been a widespread and hotly debated topic for over a decade. Nonetheless, no consensus has been reached regarding whether CEO compensation reflects an effective mechanism through which managers' interests are aligned with those of their shareholders. The two main views of executive compensation --managerial discretion and optimal contracting --offer competing explanations for the dramatic rise in executive pay over the past several decades. Under optimal contracting, contracts are the efficient result of arms' length bargaining between the board of directors and the CEO and the rise in compensation simply reflects appropriate adjustments in response to market factors. A large literature supports this view, finding corroborative evidence by looking for compensation behavior that would be consistent with market forces such as outside employment opportunities or a shift in the types of qualities desired.
1 Alternatively, under the managerial discretion view, managers exercise power over the board to expropriate from shareholders by overpaying themselves and the overall rise in executive pay reflects an increase in their power to do so. An equally large literature documents support for the "overpay" hypotheses by identifying behavior that appears to be inconsistent with efficiency such as asymmetric benchmarking or stock option re-pricing.
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This paper contributes to the ongoing debate in its evaluation of a relatively unique event.
Because the board of directors is contracting with the presumably less powerful new CEO for the first time, turnovers give the board the option to structure their CEO's compensation package as they see fit. In a sense, turnovers provide boards with an opportunity to "start over" regarding the ways in which they compensate managers and align managers' incentives with those of shareholders. Thus, turnovers have the potential to have a dramatic impact on the level and structure of compensation packages.
This paper focuses on the following question: what is the impact of a turnover event on CEO compensation? My primary purpose is to describe what we observe when a turnover event occurs. To a lesser degree, I also try to address whether or to what extent the empirical evidence allows me to distinguish between competing views of executive compensation. I investigate these questions by examining the compensation packages of incoming and outgoing CEOs. In particular, I examine differences in levels of cash pay (salary and bonus), total compensation (total of salary, bonus, Black-Scholes value stock options granted, restricted stock, payouts from long-term plans, and benefits), pay-for-performance sensitivities, and "excess pay" for a sample of 1,232 paired incoming and outgoing CEOs around turnover events occurring between 1993 and 2006. Following the approach used by Hartzell, Ofek, and Yermack (2004) , I measure "excess pay" as the residual from a standard model of CEO pay as a function of firm size, firm performance (3-year stock price performance), industry, and year.
Overall, I find that incoming CEO levels of pay and pay-for-performance sensitivities are greater than or do not differ significantly from that of the CEOs they replace. The difference in total compensation is positive and greater for outsider CEO replacements than for insider CEO replacements. This is consistent with Murphy (2002) and Murphy and Zabojnik (2007) , who look at just the incoming CEOs and find that outsider CEO replacements receive higher compensation than insider CEO replacements. I further find that when the CEO is forced out, there is no significant difference between the total compensation of the incoming and outgoing CEOs. In contrast, when the CEO leaves voluntarily, the incoming CEO is paid substantially more than his predecessor.
In distinguishing between the competing perspectives on CEO compensation, the views discussed above offer predictions for what we expect to observe when an incumbent CEO leaves and is replaced. For instance, under the assumption that an outgoing CEO's long-term involvement as the highest executive within a firm represents enhanced power (over that of his replacement), the managerial discretion view would predict that, in the event of a turnover, the outgoing CEO's pay and "excess pay" should be higher than that of his replacement while his pay-performance sensitivity should be lower. Furthermore, managerial discretion hypotheses predict that these effects will be augmented (dampened) for situations in which we expect a CEO's bargaining power to be high (low). The overall results listed above appear to contradict this hypothesis. That is, since I expect outgoing CEOs to have more power than their replacements, on average, I expect their compensation levels to be higher than those of their replacements, but find the opposite. When the replacement CEO is an insider, I presume that since he has already been an executive at the firm for at least a few years, he would have an existing relationship with the board of directors. This relationship, under the managerial discretion view, should thus lead to a higher bargaining power for insider replacements than for outsiders. Thus the results regarding outsiders are also opposite of what is expected. Further, I
interpret a forced turnover based on poor performance as representative of a situation in which the outgoing CEO's power over the board has been undermined. Thus, in comparison to outgoing CEOs leaving voluntarily, the forced out CEOs have relatively less power.
Digging a little deeper, I try to determine whether the baseline results hold because incoming CEOs are systematically higher quality CEOs. I also try to determine whether outgoing CEOs' power over the board has an impact on observed changes in CEO compensation surrounding a turnover. I find that outsider replacements are paid more than their predecessors even after controlling for skills using relative educational backgrounds (that is, the education background of the incoming CEO compared to that of his predecessor) and previous employers' return on assets (ROA). I further examine differences between incoming and outgoing CEO pay and pay-performance sensitivities based on outgoing CEO founder status, ownership levels, CEO centrality 3 , CEO tenure, board composition, and the firm's governance index. 3 Measured as in Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer (2007) as the percentage of total top-five executive pay received by the CEO.
I find that
incoming CEOs are paid more in option-based pay and total compensation regardless of whether the outgoing CEO was the founder and that the differential is larger when the outgoing CEO was the founder. Incoming CEOs are also paid more in total compensation and option-based pay when the outgoing CEO's tenure is greater than 4 years, when his ownership levels are high (above average, above 5%, and above 10%), and when the board composition indicates fewer than average independent outsiders on the board.
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Taken together, the results are difficult to reconcile with the managerial power view of executive compensation. On the one hand, we have a number of inconsistencies with the managerial discretion hypotheses as we partition the data on the basis of managerial power.
However, as we further partition the data to classify additional distinctions of power, some results tend to become consistent with those hypotheses while others do not. If, as is purported by the managerial power view, a CEO's power over the board is a primary driver of both levels and structures of compensation, much stronger results in line with managerial power hypotheses would be needed.
However, when the outgoing CEO's measure of centrality is above average and when the firm has a very high G-index, the results move in the opposite direction -with the outgoing CEO's pay moving to equal or exceed his replacement's.
As yet, I am aware of only limited research that has explicitly and comprehensively examined compensation contracts around turnover events. Rather, most papers examine turnover in the context of its being a potential component of the overall governance package that is designed to align managers' incentives and curb rent extraction -that is, the threat of turnover is typically viewed as playing a disciplinary role in the context of the manager-shareholder agency problem. These studies typically examine the occurrence of management turnover in relation to firm performance and other firm or market characteristics.
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In spirit, this paper resembles a varied set of studies regarding CEO compensation. Gilson and Vetsuypens (1990) examine the nature of compensation packages for financially distressed firms and include a discussion of changes observed when a turnover event occurs within this set of firms. They find that, within a small sample of financially distressed firms, when a turnover occurs, insider replacement CEOs are paid substantially less than their predecessors, but outsider replacement CEOs are paid substantially more. Murphy (2002) compares levels of CEO pay for insider and outsider replacement CEOs, finding that outsider replacements are typically paid more than insider replacements. This study expands upon Murphy (2002) in two major ways. First, I examine differences between the incoming and outgoing CEOs in turnover events, rather than differences between replacement CEOs' pay 5 I use 4 years as a threshold based on evidence found by Gregory-Smith, Thompson, and Wright (2009) that probabilities of CEO dismissal decline after the 4 th year and this appears to be due to entrenchment effects. 6 See, for example, Denis, Denis, and Sarin (1997); Coughlan and Schmidt (1985) ; Murphy and Zimmerman (1993) ; Huson, Parrino, and Starks (2001) ; Goyal and Park (2001) ; Lehn and Zhao (2006) based on whether they are insiders or outsiders. Second, in an attempt to explain observed changes in compensation surrounding turnover events, I extend the investigation to incorporate CEO skills and additional measures of a CEO's power over the board. Two other papers directly expand upon Murphy (2002) . Blackwell, Dudney, and Farrell (2007) examine changes in compensation structure following turnover events and relate those changes to firm performance.
Theyfind that incoming CEOs' compensation is comprised of significantly more equity-based pay and a positive association between post-turnover performance and new stock grants. Elsaid and Davidson (2009) examine differences between incoming and outgoing CEO pay and the percentages that salary and "pay-at-risk" (i.e. stock and option grants) contribute to total compensation surrounding turnover events. This paper complements and extends these papers along several lines. First, I examine a much more comprehensive set of potential CEO compensation determinants and attempt to differentiate between CEO, turnover, and firm characteristics that may contribute to managerial power in a positive way and those that may contribute to some types of "inappropriate" managerial power (i.e. power over the board based on relationships and/or entrenchment effects).
Second, a large part of the focus in both papers is on changes in the structures of compensation packages. This paper examines compensation structure as well as changes in levels of pay and relates them to relative managerial power. Finally, I seek to distinguish between competing views of executive compensation within the literature, as discussed above. Thus, there is some emphasis on managerial power and examining its impact on executive compensation.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section II describes the sample; Section III contains the preliminary results; Section IV contains additional analysis regarding what we happens to CEO compensation when a turnover event occurs; and Section V concludes.
II. Sample Selection and Summary Statistics

II.1 Sample Selection
The initial sample is collected from the Standard & Poor's ExecuComp database, which provides information on firms in the S&P 500, the Midcap 400, and the Smallcap 600, between 1993 and 2006. Data collected includes CEOs' cash pay, total compensation including the value of option grants and other forms of pay, tenure as CEO, and CEO percent equity ownership in the firm. ExecuComp provides information regarding the years during which an executive becomes the CEO and leaves office as CEO. Outgoing CEOs are identified by the year in which they leave office as CEO. Incoming CEOs are identified by the year in which they become CEO. The sample of turnovers is then constructed by matching outgoing and incoming CEOs on firm and year. The sample is then limited to those observations for which salary, bonus, and total compensation data is available for the last full year of pay of the outgoing CEO and the first full year of pay of the incoming CEO. This results in 1,232 turnover events over the 13 year period.
II.1.1 Nature of Turnover
To identify the nature of the sample turnovers, I search the Factiva and LexisNexis databases for news articles around the time period and announcements of CEO appointments. It is quite possible that within the 75% of turnovers listed above as being either planned retirements, normal successions, or resignations not classified as forced, some have been misclassified. As discussed by Denis and Denis (1995) and previously noted by Warner, Watts, and Wruck (1988) and Weisbach (1988) , press releases often do not specifically state that a CEO has been fired or ousted even when this is the case. Thus I further analyze the sample of forced turnovers to determine whether they compare with those classified as voluntary in a way that would be expected. First, prior literature has classified forced turnovers as a percentage of all sample turnovers in percentages ranging from 7.3% to 24%. It is important to note here that this rather significant variation stems from alternative specifications of forced turnovers. Here, the classification of a forced turnover is relatively conservative and results in a sample for which I am confident that the change is forced. This classification is consistent with Denis and Denis (1995) . Others classify turnovers as forced on slightly looser criterion: Parrino (1997) , Parrino, Sias, and Starks (2003) , and others classify additional turnovers as forced if the CEO is under 60 years of age and the news announcements regarding the turnover do not specify the cause as being death, illness, or departure for a new position. This typically results in a slightly higher sample representation for forced turnovers.
To further check my sample of forced turnovers, I compare firm performance, prevalence of outsider replacements (specification of these is discussed below), and CEO age for 
II.1.2 Insider/Outsider Status
Data regarding the CEOs specifically are collected from Bloomberg People Search.
Bloomberg People Search provides profiles including educational history, career history, and board memberships. CEOs are classified as insiders if they have a prior employment history with the firm in which they become CEO. Specifically, where available, if the Bloomberg People Search career history indicates employment with the firm in positions other than CEO prior to the appointment, they are considered insiders. If the career history indicates that the individual has worked for the firm for less than 3 years and that they came in at a high-level executive rank, he is considered a "recent insider". Otherwise, he is considered an outsider. "Recent insiders" deserve a brief discussion here. Where possible, these are verified through news announcements of the appointment. They represent cases in which the replacement CEO was hired away from another firm with the likely outcome that he would take over as CEO, but start off as COO or CFO. Since they were almost all hired specifically for the purpose of fulfilling a normal succession plan and since, prior to their hire, they had no employment through the firm, in the subsequent analysis, I combine the set of "recent insiders" with outsiders. Where Bloomberg People Search career histories are unavailable, Execucomp data is used to determine insider/outsider status. This occurs in few cases, but represents approximately 5% of the sample of incoming CEOs. In this case, CEOs are considered insiders if 1) the first year of the CEO's employment at the firm (according to ExecuComp) differs from the year in which he becomes CEO and 2) the executive appears in the ExecuComp database for that firm for the year prior to the year in which he becomes CEO. Table 1 and Figure 1 were forced in any given year is typically between 10% and 15%.
II.2 Summary Statistics
II.2.1 Turnover Characteristics
II.2.2 Compensation Characteristics
Table 2 presents summary statistics regarding the compensation of the CEOs in the turnover sample. Overall, mean (median) CEO cash pay and total pay are, respectively, $1.36 million ($957,526) and $4.39 million ($2.24 million). Median CEO ownership of the firm for outgoing CEOs is 1.4%, almost double the median for their replacements of .76%. At a glance, the figures in Panels B and C do not appear, other than ownership, to be significantly different from each other, including option grants. Figure 2 presents the percentage of total CEO compensation that is option-based. As a form of equity-based pay whose use has increased dramatically over the last several decades (both domestically and internationally), stock options are a main component of incentive-based pay and a large contributor to pay-performance sensitivities 7
III. Baseline Results
. The data in Figure 2 show that incoming CEO option-based pay as a percentage of total compensation is higher in every year.
III.1 Univariate Analysis: Differences in Pay
Table 3 presents the differences from paired CEOs surrounding the sample turnover events. The outgoing CEO's last full year of pay is subtracted from the incoming CEO's first full year of pay. Univariate analysis is then run on the differences. The first column shows the differences for the entire sample of turnovers. Overall, there does not appear to be a significant difference between incoming and outgoing CEO pay levels. Both mean and median cash pay as well as mean total pay are not significantly different.
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Consistent with Murphy (2002) , the second two columns show that outsider replacement CEOs, at the median, typically make $335,360 more than their predecessors while insiders are typically paid only $126,156 more than their predecessors. Table 3 also shows that there is no significant difference between incoming and outgoing CEO total compensation when the turnovers are forced. However, we observe significantly higher total compensation for incoming CEOs when the turnovers are voluntary. Again, this contradicts the managerial discretion hypotheses, presuming that the poor performance resulting in a forced turnover has undermined the outgoing CEO's power over the board.
However, median total pay differences indicate that replacements make a statistically significant $159,560 more in total compensation than those whom they are replacing. Both option-based pay and its relative contribution to total compensation are significantly higher for replacement CEOs than for those whom they are replacing. Incoming CEOs are paid, at the median, $296,130 more in options than the CEOs they are replacing. Furthermore, the percentage of total compensation that is option-based for incoming CEOs is almost 8% higher than that for their predecessors.
The last two columns of Table 3 show differences between incoming and outgoing CEO pay based on whether the outgoing CEO received "excess pay". Using an approach similar to Hartzell, Ofek, and Yermack (2004) , I calculate "excess pay" as the residual from a basic regression model. That is, using the entire universe of ExecuComp data, I run the following regression:
CEO Pay = log(MktCap) + 3-year stock returns + Industry Dummies + Year Dummies.
CEO Pay represents total compensation including restricted stock, payouts from longterm plans, benefits, and stock options valued at the grant-date using ExecuComp's modified Black-Scholes methodology. Log(MktCap) is the log of number of shares outstanding multiplied by the year-end stock price. The residuals for the sample of turnover CEOs are retained and used as an estimate of "excess pay". Interestingly, Table 3 shows that when the outgoing CEO's "excess pay" ≤ 0, his replacement is much more consistently paid more than he was and vice versa. That is, when the outgoing CEO's "excess pay" ≤ 0, the median replacement CEO is paid $490,343.50 more than his predecessor. When the outgoing CEO's "excess pay" > 0, his replacement is paid $275,269 less than his predecessor. This suggests that "excess pay" may very well be a good proxy for managerial bargaining power and also provides some support for the managerial power theory.
Alternatively, this could be a function of mean reversion in levels of compensation.
Core, Guay, and Larcker (2008) document "strong mean reversion in pay among the general population of highly paid CEOs." Examining non-turnover years relative to "excess pay" does reveal some evidence of mean reversion. That is, approximately 67% of CEOs who receive "excess pay" > 0 in a given year subsequently see a drop in their pay the following year. When a CEO receives "excess pay" > 0, the median change in pay for the following year is $-158,408.
When a CEO receives "excess pay" ≤ 0, approximately 50% subsequently see a drop in the pay the following year, but the median change in pay for the following year is $298,174.50. For the entire sample of 15,996 CEO-year observations, I observe that approximately 36% receive "excess pay" > 0. Of those observations, approximately 40% receive "excess pay" ≤ 0 the following year while the remaining 60% continue to receive positive "excess pay". So, it is clear that, at best, "excess pay" can be a rough proxy for managerial power. Consequently, I do not focus additional analysis on "excess pay", but rather try to examine other potential proxies for managerial power in subsequent sections. Table 4 presents multivariate analysis of CEO compensation surrounding the turnover event. The outgoing CEOs' last full year of pay and the incoming CEOs' first full year of pay are used. The regression follows similar lines and uses determinants identified in several prior studies including Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999), Brick, Palmon, and Wald (2006), and Graham, Li, and Qiu (2008) . The regressions specification is as follows: Here log(assets) is the log of total assets, ExecDir is a dummy which equals 1 if the CEO is on the board of directors. Ownership is the shares owned by the CEO. Tenure is the number of years the CEO has been active in his current position. Interlock is a dummy which equals 1 if the CEO is listed as a member of the executive compensation committee. Num Mtgs is the number of board meetings during the year. Prevceo is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the CEO has previously been a CEO at another firm. Newceo is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO is an incoming CEO, Insider is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO is an incoming CEO who came from within the firm, and Excess is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the outgoing CEO was paid "excess pay" > 0. As we expect, the coefficient on log(Assets) is positive and significant, consistent with the literature. Tenure has a positive and significant impact on cash pay, but is insignificant in the total compensation regressions. Interlock is negative and significant, indicating the CEO participation in the executive compensation committee actually has a negative impact on both his cash pay and his total compensation. The coefficient on Prevceo is positive and significant in the total compensation regressions, indicating that prior experience at the level of CEO results in higher subsequent levels of pay. Results here, as above in the univariate analysis, also indicate that there is little of significance in the difference between replacement CEO pay and outgoing CEO pay. The coefficient on Newceo is significant for only two of the cash pay regressions and not significant for total compensation. The coefficient on Newceo*Insider is negative and significant for both cash pay and total compensation. Thus, it appears that insider status has a negative impact on levels of pay.
III.2 Multivariate Analysis: Levels of Pay
III.3 Multivariate Analysis: Pay-Performance Sensitivities
Thus far, I have examined pay-performance sensitivities by comparing option-based pay, as in Table 3 , and found that they are consistently higher for replacement CEOs than for outgoing CEOs. However, as pay-performance sensitivities broadly incorporate any adjustments made to pay in response to firm performance, option-based pay is not the only way through which pay-performance sensitivities can be impacted. Virtually all components (salary, bonus, stock grants, and stock holdings in addition to option grants) of a CEO's compensation can be at least partially tied to firm performance. Furthermore, though compensation is potentially tied to various accounting measures of firm performance, the ultimate goal of a compensation package is to ensure that managers behave in the shareholders' best interests. Thus, the most appropriate way to link pay to performance is often considered to tie compensation to stock price performance. One way to examine pay-performance sensitivities is to quantify the impact that changes in shareholder wealth have on changes in CEO pay from year to year. Jensen and and a multitude of subsequent papers quantify this impact by regressing changes in CEO pay on changes in shareholder wealth. 
If anything, the overall evidence in Table 5 indicates pay-performance sensitivities measured in this manner appear to be lower for replacement CEOs. The coefficients on Newceo*ΔShareholder Wealth is negative and significant for changes in cash pay and not significant for changes in total pay. However, insider replacement CEOs do appear to be subjected to higher pay-performance sensitivities, as evidenced by the significant and positive coefficient on Newceo*Insider*∆Shareholder Wealth.
IV. Additional Analysis
IV.1 A Closer Look at CEOs
The initial results described above show mixed results with regards to what happens to CEO compensation when a turnover event occurs. We have seen that levels of total compensation are higher for incoming CEOs overall, that the differential between incoming and outgoing CEO pay is greater for outsider CEO replacements than for insider CEO replacements, and that there is no significant difference between incoming and outgoing CEO pay when the turnover is forced. These results are difficult to reconcile with the managerial discretion view of CEO compensation. As discussed in previous sections, I expect an outgoing CEO to have more managerial power than his replacement simply by virtue of his standing position and relationship with the board of directors. Furthermore, insiders (who have served as other high level executives of the firm and are also expected to have a relationship with the board of directors) are expected to have higher managerial power than outsiders and outgoing CEOs who are forced out are expected to have lower managerial power than outgoing CEOs who leave voluntarily.
Thus, managerial discretion hypotheses predict the opposite result to those listed above.
However, the initial results do not address the possibility that observed differences in CEO pay between outgoing and incoming CEOs are driven by CEO characteristics not yet examined. That is, I posit that there are two sources of managerial power: 1) managerial skill, ability, and effort (skill-based power) and 2) power over the board of directors (board-based power). Both sources of managerial power are expected, under the managerial discretion view, to cause increases in executive compensation. However, only the second results in inefficient levels of pay or inefficient compensation structures. Thus far, the analysis has made no distinction between the two sources of managerial power. It may be possible, however, that managerial skill overwhelms managerial power over the board of directors in many cases. If this is the case, then what we observe above reflects systematically higher quality replacement CEOs (than the managers they replace), that outsider replacements are systematically higher quality replacements than insider replacements, and that firms recruit higher quality CEOs when their own CEOs leave voluntarily than when they fire their CEOs
In this section, I more closely examine CEO characteristics to see whether they can explain what we observe in the preliminary analysis section. In an effort to determine which contributor to CEO compensation (skill-based power or board-based power) seems to drive my results, I examine characteristics expected to be tied to CEO skill alongside characteristics expected to be tied to the CEO's relative power within the organization (i.e. power over the board). In particular, for skill-based power, I examine the impact of education and the insider/outsider specification and prior firm performance where possible on the pay of incoming and outgoing CEOs surrounding a turnover. For board-based power, I examine the impact of founder status, tenure, high equity ownership, board composition, the GIM-index, and CEO centrality.
These are all considered throughout the literature to be associated either directly with managerial power (as in founder status, tenure, and CEO centrality) or indirectly via their impact on the quality of governance mechanisms. Donaldson and Lorch (1983), Finkelstein (1992) , and Adams, Almeida, and Ferreira (2005) are just a few of the papers that discuss the increased influence of ownership and founder status on the board of directors. Tenure as CEO undoubtedly is positively associated with a CEO's influence over the board. Furthermore, Gregory-Smith, Thompson, and Wright (2009) find that the likelihood of CEO departure drops dramatically after a CEO's fourth year in office and that this appears to be due to CEO entrenchment. Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer (2007) find that CEO centrality (measured as the percentage of top five executive total pay received by the CEO 9
The GIM index constructed by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) has largely been used to measure the quality of corporate governance. It is constructed by summing indicators for various 24 charter provisions, bylaw provisions, and other firm-level rules associated with hostile bidders, voting rights, director/officer protection, other takeover defenses, and state laws. A higher index score represents greater managerial power and weaker shareholder rights.
) is negatively associated with firm value and correlated with a broad set of firm behavior and performance including higher "pay-for-luck" (either in the form of a "lucky" option grant at the lowest price of the month or in a lower tendency for the firm to filter out industry and/or market-wide returns before rewarding the CEO for performance) and lower likelihood of CEO turnover. Independent (or outside) board members are expected to be farther removed from the CEO (and have a more tenuous relationship with the CEO) and thus are expected to have a negative impact on managerial power. However, Cyert, Kang, and Kumar (1997) Founder status is identified via a combination of Bloomberg People Search, news searches, online company histories, and company web-sites. Specifically, when Bloomberg specifies that a CEO is a founder, this is used. If the CEO is not identified as a founder, the news search regarding the turnover event is double-checked for any background information on the individuals. This allows for a designation of both founder status and family status. If founder status is still not found through either of these sources, I search for company histories online using Google. If founder status is still not found, I go directly to the company's web-site.
Regarding CEO characteristics of founder vs. non-founder outgoing CEOs, only 8.8% of founders have MBAs, less than 1% are CPAs, 9.9% have Master's degrees, 7% have earned a PhD, and 4.1% have earned law degrees. On average, they hold 1.7 board seats at the time of the turnover and 3.6 board seats over their careers. Average tenure for founders is 12 years, a statistically significant (at the .01 level) 5 years greater than for non-founders. Founders also own a significantly larger proportion of the firm in comparison to non-founders (3.98% vs. 1.02).
This difference is also significant at the .01 level. CEO centrality is also higher for founders, but this difference is only significant at the .1 level and is only 1%. Only 25.7% of founders have "excess pay" > 0. In contrast, among non-founders, 36.5% have "excess pay" > 0. Almost twice as many non-founders have MBAs. More non-founders also hold master's degrees, participated in an executive management program, or are CPAs. Non-founder CEOs also hold more board memberships both at the time of the turnover (2.3) and over their careers (4.9). Table 6 shows additional univariate analysis of differences in pay based on insider/outsider status and education. Prior literature has established a potential shift in the relative desirability of general managerial skills and specific managerial skills. Murphy and Zabojnik (2007) argue that such a trend has occurred, making the "skills critical in leading a complex modern corporation but not specific to any organization" more important over recent years than the "skills, knowledge, contacts, and experience valuable only within the organization." In support of their argument, they document a parallel between rises in CEO pay, increases in CEOs holding MBA degrees, and decreases in managerial firm-specific experience.
IV.1.2 Univariate Analysis: Skill-Based Managerial Power
IV.1.2.1 Education
Thus, these two categorizations are made to distinguish between skills expected to be useful for all high-level management regardless of firm and those that firm-or industry-specific.
Educational background is used as a rough proxy for these types of skills. As in Murphy and Zabojnik (2007) and Palia (2000) , I consider whether the CEO has obtained an MBA or law degree. I additionally consider whether the CEO has completed an executive management program and whether he is a certified public accountant to be representative of general managerial skills. Firm-or industry-specific skills are proxied for by more specific educational attainment including professional certifications (such as Professional Engineer) and master's degrees and PhDs in specific fields (such as engineering or computer science.
To aggregate the educational information acquired through Bloomberg PeopleSearch, I construct two variables: general_skills and specific_skills. These variables are the sums of dummy variables to indicate whether the CEO has completed these various degrees and/or programs. Specifically,
• General_skills = mba + cpa + lawyer + executive management program
• Specific_skills = masters degree + phd + certification These variables are constructed for each of the CEOs. Then, the value for incoming CEOs is subtracted from that for outgoing CEOs to determine the relative education levels of the CEOs involved in the turnover event.
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Panel A of Table 6 shows the differences in pay levels between incoming and outgoing CEOs on the basis of "general" and "specific" skills. The first two columns show differences on the basis of whether the replacement CEO has a higher level of "general_skills" than the outgoing CEO. Interestingly, though the differential is higher for replacement CEOs with a 10 The literature handles education in a multitude of ways, none of which are identical to this method. There is some support for examining education in this way, however. Gottesman and Morey (2006) assume that higher levels of education equate with higher quality educations (that is, CEOs with graduate degrees have had a higher quality education than those without) higher level of "general_skills", even those replacement CEOs who have lower or equal levels of "general_skills" are paid more (at the median) than those they replace. Also interesting is that only around 12.8% of the replacement CEOs have higher general skills/education than those they replace. Options granted are higher for replacement CEOs regardless of relative "general_skills", but option-based pay (as a percentage of total compensation) is only higher for CEOs with "general_skills" lower than or equal to the outgoing CEO.
The other columns in Panel A of Table 6 show the differences based on "specific_skills".
It is interesting here to note that when the replacement CEO has higher "specific_skills" than the CEO he is replacing, there is no difference in pay between the two, though he is still paid more than the outgoing CEO if his "specific_skills" are lower than or equal to the outgoing CEOs.
This counterintuitive result suggests that the parameters contributing to the "specific_skills" variable do not drive compensation levels. Again, it is interesting to note that only approximately 13% of the replacement CEOs have higher specific skills/education than those they replace. Regarding option-based pay, we see a similar result to above regarding "general_skills". Overall, Panel A shows that neither differences in "general_skills" nor differences in "specific_skills" can explain the overall positive differential between incoming and outgoing CEO pay. That is, Table 6 shows not only that is it relatively rare for the incoming CEO to possess higher "general" or "specific" skills than his predecessor, but that even when he does not, he is still paid more than his predecessor. Next, I examine the impact of managerial skill on the differentials we observe when replacement CEOs are insiders vs when they are outsiders.
Though it appears to be inconsistent with the managerial discretion view of CEO compensation that outsider replacement CEOs would be paid more than the CEOs they replace and that the differential would be greater for outsider replacements than for insider replacements, other forces could be driving this result. In particular, it could be the fact that outsider replacements are systematically higher quality CEOs (than both those they replace and potential insider candidates). If this is the case, we would expect to see some different results regarding CEO characteristics and insider/outsider status. For instance, if general managerial skills are highly valued and this drives the result regarding outsider replacements, then we would expect to see both that outsider replacements have higher general managerial skills than those whom they replace and that the differential results we have seen above hold only for the group of outsider replacements who have higher general managerial skills. We would also expect to see that there are relatively less insider replacements with higher general managerial skills than outsider replacements.
Panel B of Table 6 shows the differences in pay levels on the basis of insider/outsider status and education levels. Interestingly, outsiders are paid more than their predecessors regardless of whether their "general_skills" are higher than those of their predecessors, though the differential is larger when the incoming CEO has a more comprehensive general education.
Furthermore, only 62 of the 332 outsider replacements have higher general skills/education than those they replace. This represents approximately 15% of the outsider CEOs, slightly higher than the 12.8% found overall for replacement CEOs, but is still remarkably low. One interesting and counterintuitive result is that insider replacements are paid more than their predecessors only if their "general_skills" or "specific_skills" are less than those of their predecessors. This seems to indicate that skills (as proxied by education) does not drive pay differentials between incoming and outgoing CEOs when the replacement is an insider.
IV.1.2.2 Outsider Replacements' Prior Performance
In contrast to proxying for skills using relative education, an alternative is to examine the prior performance of the outsider replacement CEOs. Though this allows for a limited analysis of a much smaller subset of the turnovers, it may be able to shed light on whether, at least for these outsider replacements, our differences in pay between the replacements and their predecessors are driven by skill. I first obtain information about outsider replacement CEOs prior compensation and compare that to the compensation they receive one year after the turnover event. The prior compensation data is obtained through Execucomp. There are approximately 160 outsider replacement CEOs for whom this data is available. On average, these incoming CEOs receive a pay increase of $860,954 in total cash compensation (salary + bonus) and a raise of $2,203,280 in total compensation. Approximately 37% of them received "excess pay" > 0 at their previous jobs.
Panel A of Table 7 shows differences for just these outsider CEO replacements based on the performance of the firm at which they were previously employed and based on whether they received "excess pay" at the firm at which they were previously employed. On average, the ROA of these firms (at which outsider CEO replacements were previously employed) is 4.8%. I thus use 4.8% as the threshold for above average performance.
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The first columns show that when the outsider replacements come from firms at which the ROA > 4.8%, they are paid substantially more than the CEOs they are replacing, but when their previous employer's ROA < 4.8%, only cash compensation and option-based pay are higher than the CEOs they are replacing, while total compensation is not significantly different. Thus, it appears that prior firm performance for outsider replacements does indeed explain part of the differential. However, the results regarding the CEOs whose prior performance was average or worse are still inconsistent with the managerial power hypotheses. These CEOs still get paid as much as their predecessors who should have more managerial power over the board and thus be paid more. Furthermore, their cash pay is still higher than their predecessors'. Since a CEO's preference is, wherever possible, going to be certain cash pay over uncertain equity-based pay, managerial power hypotheses predict that, as power increases, cash pay will increase and payperformance sensitivities will decline. Thus, under managerial power, we would expect this subset to be paid less cash pay and more option-based pay than his predecessor. While optionbased pay is, indeed, higher for the replacements in this scenario, the differential is not substantially different from the replacements whose prior firm performance is above average (at the median, option-based pay for those whose prior firm performance is average or worse is 11.9% higher than their predecessors vs. 11% for those whose prior firm performance is above average).
The latter columns show that when the outsider replacements did not receive "excess pay" at their previous firm, they are paid significantly more than the CEOs whom they replace, but when they did receive "excess pay" previously, only their cash compensation is higher than the CEOs they replace. This is a somewhat puzzling result, particularly for the managerial discretion hypotheses. Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker (2004) argue that outsider replacements who are previously CEOs at other firms have already been exercising their discretion at these other firms to extract rents and pay packages reflect this. They then further argue that, in order to entice these executives to change employers, the rents extracted at the prior firm must be met by the new firm. The expectation, then, is that those outsider CEO replacements who received "excess pay" at their prior firms would be paid more than those who did not. This would then 11 However, the results listed below hold if industry-adjusted ROA is used instead with a threshold of 0% imply that differentials between incoming and outgoing CEO pay for these CEOs would be greater than for those not receiving "excess pay" at their prior job. What we observe is the opposite.
The final univariate check with regard to CEO skill-based power that I perform reflects univariate differences in pay based on whether the outgoing CEO achieves subsequent employment as a CEO elsewhere. This set may reflect outgoing CEOs with above average abilities and thus may be able to shed some light on what we observe with regard to changes in CEO pay surrounding turnover events. I first gather information about the compensation of outgoing CEOs who subsequently obtain employment at other firms as CEOs. The subsequent employment data is gathered through Execucomp. There are 80 CEOs for whom I find definite new employment as a CEO within 3 years of the turnover event. Of these, subsequent compensation data is available for half (40 outgoing CEOs). On average, the differences between the total cash compensation and total compensation for the outgoing CEOs at the new firm and at the turnover firm are $152,559.50 and $5,184,886. Approximately 35% of these outgoing CEOs received "excess pay" > 0 at the turnover firms. Approximately 55% of them receive "excess pay" > 0 at the subsequent employers. Panel B of Table 7 shows differences between incoming and outgoing CEO pay surrounding the turnover event based on whether the CEOs obtain subsequent employment. When the outgoing CEO does find subsequent employment within 3 years of the turnover, there is no significant difference between his cash or total compensation and that of his replacement. However, when he does not find subsequent employment, the results more closely mirror our overall results (higher total compensation and option-based compensation for the incoming CEO). We would have expected the opposite results. Thus it appears that subsequent employment as a proxy for outgoing CEO skill also cannot explain our overall results.
IV.1.3 Univariate Analysis: Board-Based Managerial Power
We have seen that the preliminary results regarding differences in pay can, at best, only be partially explained by our proxies for CEO skill. Next we turn to whether they can be explained by proxies for managerial power. For this analysis, we examine the impact of board composition, founder status, CEO centrality, CEO tenure, CEO firm ownership, and GIM-index on compensation surrounding the turnover events.
Panel A of Table 8 shows differences between incoming and outgoing CEO pay when the outgoing CEO is the founder and when he is not the founder. We would expect founders to have more power over their boards. However, while in both categories outgoing CEOs are paid less than their replacements, but the differential is larger when the outgoing CEO is the founder rather than when he is not the founder. Whatever board-based power a CEO may derive via his status as founder of the firm does not drive our results regarding overall differences in pay.
Thus, we again see results in direct opposition to what we would expect under the managerial discretion view.
Another proxy for board-based managerial power is CEO centrality, as discussed above.
Panel A of Table 8 also shows univariate differences results based on whether CEO centrality is above or below average. When CEO centrality is average or below average, the incoming CEO makes significantly more in total cash pay, option-based pay, and total compensation. On the other hand, when CEO centrality is above average, the outgoing CEO makes more in total cash pay and slightly less option-based pay. Total compensation does not significantly differ between incoming and outgoing CEOs within this set of turnovers. These results move in the direction that the managerial discretion view would expect. However, only cash pay results match predictions that would stem from the managerial discretion view. That is, here managerial discretion would predict higher cash and total pay for the outgoing CEO based on his enhanced power over the board (as reflected by his high value for CEO centrality). Furthermore, since any manager will prefer riskless pay to risky pay, all else equal, we would expect the option-based pay differential here to increase. That is, the managerial discretion view would also predict that the incumbent CEO would exercise his power over the board to reduce his exposure to risk, increasing any non-performance based pay and decreasing the performance-based pay. This gives ambiguous predictions on levels of options granted, but not on option-based pay as a percentage of total pay. But what we observe is that, while for average to low CEO centrality, the difference in option-based pay is 9.5%, for above average CEO centrality, it is a mere .3%.
If founder status and CEO centrality cannot explain our results, perhaps a simple look at tenure or ownership can. Table 8 His total compensation does not significantly differ from that of his replacement. On the other side, when tenure is greater than 4 years (and he is presumably entrenched), his replacement makes slightly less in cash pay, more in options and option-based pay, and significantly more in total compensation. If this enhanced power over the board results in managerial manipulation of pay levels and structure, we would expect to see that the outgoing CEOs whose tenures were longer than 4 years would be paid more than their replacements.
We observe similar results regarding CEO ownership in the firm. Using average outgoing CEO firm ownership as a threshold, table 8 shows that incoming CEOs are paid more than their predecessors regardless of whether the outgoing CEO has below average or average levels of firm ownership or whether he has above average levels of firm ownership. The differential, however, increases for the group for which CEO firm ownership is above average.
That is, if CEOs own 1.4% of the firm or less, their replacements make a statistically significant $128,210 more than they do while if CEOs own more than 1.4% of the firm, their replacements make a statistically significant $343,480 more. This, too, is inconsistent with managerial discretion hypotheses. Presuming that higher levels of ownership result in higher managerial power, we would expect to observe the opposite results under managerial discretion.
Admittedly, ownership is a slightly more complicated issue since it is also shown through the literature to effectively align managers' incentives with those of shareholders in a manner similar to what compensation packages attempt to do. Thus, it is quite possible that compensation levels are lower for CEOs with high levels of ownership in the firm because the need to align their incentives with those of shareholders is reduced by their ownership levels.
Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988), Hermalin and Weisbach (1987) , and McConnell and Servaes (1990) demonstrate a non-monotonic relationship between firm value and insider ownership that is believed to reflect the trade-off between the incentives and entrenchment effects of ownership. They all show that concentrated ownership first enhances firm value, but then, at differing thresholds, starts to detract from firm value. It is important to note, however, that none of this detracts from the expectations that higher levels of CEO firm ownership result in higher managerial power over the board. However, in untabulated results, the analysis is run with higher thresholds (5% and 10% firm ownership).
12
It could be that differences in pay are driven by firm-level governance characteristics rather than CEO governance characteristics. To explore this possibility, I examine the impact of the firms' governance indices and board compositions. The governance index first introduced by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) , commonly referred to as simply the Gindex, is acquired through the RiskMetrics Governance database, which provides data regarding various governance characteristics of firms, including the constructed gindex. Board size and composition (measured as the percentage of directors who are independent) are obtained through the RiskMetrics Directors database, which provides detailed data regarding board provides detailed data regarding board members of a large number of firms.
The results from above hold and, in fact, are even strong, reflected an even larger positive differential between replacement CEO pay and outgoing CEO pay when outgoing CEO firm ownership is greater than 5% or 10%.
Panel B of Table 8 shows univariate differences results based on these two governance proxies as well as based on financial distress (as discussed below). G-index results are based on whether or not firm G-index is in the 75 th percentile or higher (this equates to a G-index of 11 or greater). When the G-index is below the 75 th percentile, incoming CEO total compensation and option-based compensation are both significantly higher than for the incumbent CEO. In contrast, when the G-index is at or above the 75 th percentile, only options and option-based pay are higher for the incoming CEO. Neither cash nor total compensation are significantly different. These results are similar to those regarding CEO centrality. That is, the differences in pay between incoming and outgoing CEOs moves in the direction the managerial discretion theories would predict based on increased incumbent CEO power over the board. But they do not reach the predicted difference being significant and positive on the outgoing CEO side.
Board composition results are based on the percentage of independent outsiders on the board of directors being above or below average. Here, we see that in both categories, total cash and total compensation are both higher for the incoming CEO. However, the differential is greater and significant when the percentage of independent directors is below average. So, again here, we see that managerial power cannot be explaining our differentials. That is, an incumbent 12 Morck et al (1988) find that firm value rises as insider ownership increases up to 5%, then declines until insider ownership reaches 25%, then rises again. Thus, 5% appears to be one appropriate threshold to use. Further, 5% allows for the subsample for high CEO ownership to allow for meaningful statistical analysis (there are 117 outgoing CEOs whose ownership levels are above 5% and 64 CEOs whose ownership levels are above 10%).
CEO can be expected to have more power over his board in firms where there are less independent board members. If this is the case, then we would expect the outgoing CEO in these firms to be paid more than his successor, but not necessarily so in firms where the board composition represents a relatively higher proportion of independent directors. Table 8 shows that this does not appear to be the case. Specifically, it shows differences in pay based on the percentage of the board that is comprised of independent directors. When the board composition indicates lower percentages of independent directors, the outgoing CEO's total compensation is significantly less than that of his replacement. When the board composition indicates higher percentages of independent directors, the outgoing CEO total cash compensation and total compensation are not significantly different from those of his replacement.
The final univariate check I perform related to board-based managerial power tests Here, a similar argument can be made to the one for forced turnovers. If the firm is in financial distress, it is likely that the manager is at a relative bargaining disadvantage (to is 3.6 and the percentage of firms in danger of bankruptcy (with a Zscore less than 1.8) is approximately 23%. As the final alternative measure, I use stockholder returns, return on assets (ROA), and leverage ratios similar to Opler and Titman (1994) . This measure classifies firms with leverage ratios in deciles 8-10 for all firms' leverage ratios and negative stock holder returns and ROA as financially distressed firm. Using this measure, approximately 4.5% of firms are in financial distress. When we expect the relative managerial power to be lower (i.e. when turnovers or forced or when firms are in financial distress), there is no significant difference between cash or total compensation while when we expect relative managerial power to be higher, the incoming CEO makes significantly more than his predecessor.
The final analysis performed is multivariate analysis of levels of CEO pay and differences between incoming and outgoing CEO pay. I first examine CEO compensation levels surrounding the turnover event incorporating CEO skill and board-based power characteristics.
The outgoing CEOs' last full year of pay and the incoming CEOs' first full year of pay are used. Here, the specifications for the first 10 variables are as listed above in the Baseline Results section. General skills are the constructed variable from above based on general educational achievements, specific skills are the constructed variable from above based on specific educational achievements, board composition is the percentage of board members who are independent, financial distress is a dummy for whether the firm is in financial distress as defined above, board memberships t is the number of board seats held at the time of the turnover, board memberships c is the number of board seats held over the CEO's career, PrevROA is the ROA for the firm at which the incoming CEO was previously employed (if he is an outsider), and PrevExcess is a dummy for whether the incoming CEO received "excess pay" from his previous employer.
In untabulated results, there is very little change in coefficients or interpretation from the previous multivariate analysis. The one major difference is that the almost all coefficients of Newceo and Newceo*insider become insignificant. The adjusted R 2 for the new specifications are higher than in the simpler specification, but do not represent a dramatic increase in explanatory power (typical increase is around .5%). The analysis does find positive and significant coefficients for both general and specific education. It also finds that founders receive less cash and total compensation. Firms that are in financial distress pay their CEOs less cash. Board seats held at the time of the turnover does not appear to impact compensation around this time, but board seats held over the course of a career do positively impact total compensation. Firm performance for previous CEOs at their prior firms has a positive and significant coefficient for total compensation, but whether they received "excess pay" does not.
Finally, to confirm univariate results regarding differences in CEO pay, I regress the incoming CEO's compensation minus the outgoing CEO's compensation on my proxies for managerial power and skill. The specification is the following:
Here, cutoffs for the independent variables are defined as above in the univariate results.
In untabulated results, I find only two significant coefficients for this regression and a very low adjusted R 2 of .0155, indicating (as the univariate results suggest) that these proxies contribute very little to differences in compensation when a turnover occurs. The two exceptions appear to be that, financial distress and high CEO centrality for the outgoing CEO both have a positive impact on outgoing CEO pay relative to that of his replacement. These results, as well as the non-significance of the remaining coefficients, are consistent with my univariate findings.
V. Conclusion
In this study, I have empirically examined what happens to CEO compensation when turnover occurs. Because turnover events involve the negotiation of a new contract for the newly appointed CEO, they inherently provide opportunity for modification of compensation. Thus, we may expect to find some dramatic changes in pay levels and/or structures surrounding a turnover event. Turnovers can also be further instructive to the compensation debate because they involve CEOs whose expected power over the board differ considerably. Thus, in this study, I have examined changes in CEO compensation levels and structures to determine whether or not boards of directors capitalize on the opportunity provided by a turnover event to change the ways in which they pay their CEO. I further undertake to determine whether firm characteristics or CEO characteristics have an impact on what is observed regarding compensation surrounding turnover events.
Overall, I observe that option-based pay and total compensation increase from outgoing CEO to incoming CEO. I further observe that the positive differential between replacement and incumbent pay is larger for outsider replacements and when the turnover is voluntary (rather than forced). Incorporating various measures of CEO skill/abilities and potential sources of influence over the board, I find that these overall differences in pay between incoming and outgoing CEOs largely cannot be explained by either of these factors.
To determine whether CEO skill can explain my overall results, such that the incoming CEO receives more than his predecessor more so when measures of skill are higher, I examine CEO education and outsider CEO prior firm performance and "excess pay". I find that, whether or not the incoming CEO has achieved a higher level of education relative to his predecessor, he is still paid the same as or more than his predecessor. The same holds true for outsider replacements regardless of prior firm performance or prior "excess pay". I expect that all of prior firm performance, "excess pay", and relative education levels indicate higher levels of skill for the incoming CEO. Thus skill cannot explain our overall results.
To determine whether an outgoing CEO's power over the board can help to explain my results, such that the outgoing CEO's compensation is less than that of his replacement only when his power over the board appears to be weak, I examine firm and CEO characteristics that I expect to impact a CEO's power over the board. Specifically, I propose that an outgoing CEO's power over the board is weakened when the turnover is forced, when the firm is in financial distress, when the CEO is not the founder or a co-founder of the firm, when CEO centrality is below average, when his "excess pay" ≤ 0, when the outgoing CEO has been at the firm for 4 years or less, when his firm ownership levels are low, and when the firm's Gindex is low. I find that replacement CEOs are paid more total compensation than their predecessors regardless of whether the turnover is forced or voluntary, but the difference is only statistically significant when the turnover is voluntary. Replacement CEOs are also paid more in option-based pay regardless of the nature of the turnover and regardless of financial distress. Cash and total compensation differences between incoming and outgoing CEOs are not significantly different when firms are in financial distress.
When the outgoing CEO is the founder or a co-founder of the firm, I find that his replacement also makes more than he did and that these differences are greater within this group of outgoing CEOs than within the turnovers involving non-founder CEOs. Similar results hold regarding tenure. That is, regardless of a tenure of 4 years or less or a longer tenure, the incoming CEO receives more than his predecessor, but the difference is greater and more significant when the outgoing CEO's tenure is longer than 4 years. When the outgoing CEO has relatively higher levels of firm ownership, this differential also lies on the incoming CEO side and is larger than when his ownership levels are lower. All of these results contradict the notion that managerial power over the board can explain observed differences in CEO pay in a way predicted by the managerial discretion view of CEO compensation. Though results regarding CEO centrality and the Gindex move more in the direction expected by the managerial discretion view, they do not come inline with direct predictions. That is, hypotheses predict a clear positive differential between outgoing and incoming CEOs within those for whom outgoing CEO centrality is high or the firm's Gindex is high. However, the results simply show no statistically significant difference between the two CEOs' compensation within these firms. Taken altogether, the analysis suggests that managerial power is not driving observed changes in compensation, but provide limited opportunity for explaining what is the driving force. 1994 1996 1998 2001 2002 2003 2005 This table presents multivariate analysis of CEO compensation levels around a turnover event. The logs of total cash pay and total compensation are the dependent variables. Log(assets) is the log of total assets. ExecDir is a dummy which equals 1 if the CEO is on the board of directors. Ownership is the shares owned of the CEO. Tenure is the number of years the CEO has been active in his current position. Newceo is a dummy which equals 1 if the CEO is a replacement CEO. Interlock is a dummy which equals 1 if the CEO is listed as a member of the executive compensation committee. Num Mtgs is the number of board meetings during the year. Excess is a dummy which equals 1 if the outgoing CEO has Excess Pay > 0. Insider is a dummy which equals one if the replacement CEO is an insider. Prevceo is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the CEO has previously been a CEO at another firm. T-stats are clustered at the firm level and are in parentheses.
Total Cash Pay
Total Compensation This table presents multivariate analysis of pay-performance sensitivity around a turnover event. Total cash pay and total compensation are the dependent variables. ExecDir is a dummy which equals 1 if the CEO is on the board of directors. Ownership is the ownership level of the CEO. Newceo is a dummy which equals 1 if the CEO is a replacement CEO. Resigned is a dummy which equals 1 if the CEO was forced to resign the following year. Insider is a dummy which equals one if the replacement CEO is an insider. T-stats are in parentheses. 
